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The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1968-1969 Term
A Symposium
[Editor's Note. The articles in this symposium discuss selected decisions of
Louisiana appellate courts reported in the advance sheets dated July 1, 1968





In George v. Bertrand' the Court of Appeal for the Third
Circuit held that the biological father of a child could not recover
under article 2315 of the Civil Code for that child's wrongful
death where the child was born during the marriage of his mother
to another man. Even though the mother and the biological
father, who married after the birth of the decedent, had been
living in open concubinage at the time of the child's conception
and birth, the court held that the child was the legitimate child
of the husband of the prior marriage, rather than the legitimated
child of the biological father. The court's decision is quite con-
sistent with the previous Louisiana jurisprudence.2 Unfortunately
it illustrates how unnecessarily shaky that jurisprudence makes
the constitutional foundation of Louisiana family law.
The court of appeal rejected the contention that denial of a
remedy would violate Levy v. Louisianas and its companion case
Glona v. American Guarantee and Liability4 on the grounds that:
"[T]hese cases hold that an illegitimate child, or the mother
of an illegitimate child cannot be prevented from suing under
La. C.C. Art. 2315 for the death of the other ....
"It is obvious from the wording of these cases that they
have no application to the facts at hand. Vergie Lee George
was not an illegitimate, but rather the legitimate child of
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 217 So.2d 47 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1969).
2. See, e.g., Feazel v. Feazel, 222 La. 113, 62 So.2d 119 (1952); Succession
of Saloy, 44 La. Ann. 433, 10 So. 872 (1892); Eloi v. Mader, 1 Rob. 581 (La.
1841).
3. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
4. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
(171]
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Velma Roxie Myles and Willie Jackson. There is no discrimi-
nation against Ruffin George, he is simply not the legitimate
father of the deceased. 5
The Court's narrow reading of Levy is dubious. The rationale
of Levy was not based on the technical label of illegitimacy per
se, but the use of this legal classification to deny a remedy to
one class of persons that was granted to another, where the rela-
tionship in both cases was deemed to be essentially the same.
Justice Douglas stated:
"Legitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has no relation to
the nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother.
These children, though illegitimate, were dependent on her;
she cared for them and nurtured them; they were indeed hers
in the biological and in the spiritual sense; in her death they
suffered wrong in the sense that any dependent would.
"We conclude that it is invidious to discriminate against
them when no action, conduct, or demeanor of theirs is pos-
sibly relevant to the harm that was done the mother."
Levy did not hold that the children should recover because
they were illegitimate, but because there existed a substantial
parent-child relationship between the mother and her children.
Such a relationship also existed in George v. Bertrand. The mere
fact that the biological father was denied relief because his child
was labeled the legitimate child of another man instead of ille-
gitimate would seem to be irrelevant under Levy and Glona.
Suppose that in the next case that comes before the court,
it is the child who is suing for the wrongful death of his biological
father who, as in Bertrand, had treated him as his. What "action,
conduct, or demeanor" of the child will the court point to in
denying him the right to recover for the death of the only person
he has known as his father? Will it be enough for the court to
say to him: "You could have recovered for the death of one who
never supported you, but you cannot do so for the death of him
who had heretofore sustained you"?
The George v. Bertrand situation may be contrasted with
that presented the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in Houma Well Service v. Fontenot.7 There it was plainly
rational not to extend Levy to the point where legal relation-
5. George v. Bertrand, 217 So.2d 47, 49 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
6. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968).
7. 413 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1969).
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ship would be equated with biological relationship. The mother
of the decedent claimed that under Levy she should be allowed
the opportunity of proving the true "biological fact" that her
son's wife's daughter, born before the dissolution of their mar-
riage by divorce, was not the child of her son, the decedent, so
that the mother, rather than the child, could recover under the
Jones Act. The court there ruled that "Louisiana undoubtedly
has an interest in protecting the intimate family relationship
from divisive and destructive attacks by those seeking to chal-
lenge the legitimacy of children born during wedlock,"8 and denied
the mother the opportunity to prove the child illegitimate, where
neither she, her son's heir, nor her son had brought an action to
disavow the child within the time allowed by law.
The definitive decision on the constitutionality of Louisiana's
system of legal relationships may well depend on whether the
case the United States Supreme Court chooses to decide is on its
facts similar to the situation in George v. Bertrand or that in
Houma Well Service v. Fontenot. There is ample language in
Levy to support the proposition that legal relationship does not
have to equal biological relationship and that legal relationship
only needs to be recognized where there is a psychological or
economic relationship of parent and child.9 But those additional
factors that might be deemed to be required under Levy were
present in George v. Bertrand. If a case like George v. Bertrand
ever reached the United States Supreme Court it might decide
on the non-biological bases of the relationship; but there is a
substantial danger that it might decide simply on the presence of
8. Id. at 512.
9. See quotation from Levy at text accompanying note 6 supra. There
is also language to support a broad construction of Levy. For such construc-
tion see Estate of Jensen v. Undhjem, 162 N.W.2d 861 (N.D. 1968), where
the Supreme Court of North Dakota ruled that state's inheritance statute
unconstitutional, stating: "Applying the reasoning in Levy, as no action,
conduct, or demeanor of the illegitimate children in the instant case is rele-
vant to their status of illegitimacy, we conclude that the classification for
purposes of inheritance . . . , which is based on such a status and which
results in illegitimate children being disinherited while their legitimate
brother inherit is unreasonable." Id. at 878.
New York and Missouri are in accord with North Dakota on the broad
reading of Levy. See E.M.R. & G.P.R. v. G.E.R., 431 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1968);
Maternity Petition of Matilda Storm v. None, 57 Misc.2d 342, 291 N.Y.S.2d
515 (N.Y. 1968); Trent v. Loru, 57 Misc.2d 382, 292 N.Y.S.2d 524 (N.Y. 1968).
For a narrow construction of Levy see Baston v. Sears, 15 Ohio St. 166,
168, 239 N.E.2d 62, 63 (1968). "Levy v. Louisiana .. .had not been decided
at the time the appellee presented his case to this court, but we believe that
it is inapplicable. The rights announced in Levy were based on the intimate,
familial relationship which exists between a mother and her child, whether
the child is legitimate or illegitimate."
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the biological relationship with grave consequences to our law
of successions and the stability of titles to property that have
passed by succession, as well as to our family law. Therefore it
would be well if the Louisiana courts could insure that situations
like George v. Bertrand would not arise, if the damage done by
the Supreme Court's unfortunate intrusion into this aspect of
private law is to be limited.
The Louisiana courts could prevent cases like George v.
Bertrand from reaching the Supreme Court by giving the Civil
Code a more logical interpretation. The Court in George v. Ber-
trand stated that "there is no question that the child . . . was
conceived and born during the marriage of"'0 his mother to her
previous husband. However it ignored articles 193-197 of the
Civil Code under which only certain types of proof of filiation
will bring the presumption of legitimacy of article 184 into
operation.
Article 193 provides the primary type of such proof, a "regis-
ter of birth or baptism" stating the child's filiation, or what the
French call a title (titre) to the status of a legitimate child of
the marriage.""' This the child of the decedent of the Houma Well
Service case evidently had; the deceased child of George v. Ber-
trand did not.
Articles 194 and 195 establish the second way in which the
presumption of article 184 becomes applicable. That is where the
child has possessed the status of a legitimate child though lacking
title to it. 12 To possess a status is to enjoy the benefits and repu-
10. George v. Bertrand, 217 So.2d 47, 48 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
11. Cf. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 193, 194 and the corresponding articles in the
Code Napoleon. The latter read: Art. 319: "La flitation se prouve par
l'extrait du registre civil des naissances incr4ts sur Ie registre de 1'6tat
civil."
Art. 320: "A ddfaut de co titre, la possess4on constante de 1'tat d'enfant
Idgitime suffit."
The expression co tttre, "this title," refers to the "civil register of birth,"
which is roughly equivalent to "the register of birth or baptism" of our Code.
The French had a more highly developed system of registry of birth and
may also have been motivated by the secularist ideology of the Revolution
in not allowing a register of baptism. This writer has used the expression
"title" in the text as a short expression for the "register of birth or bap-
tism" of our Code, which is the phrase consistently used wherever the French
Civil Code speaks of "title" or "civil register of births," since our lengthy
expression Is functionally equivalent to the shorter French expression with
the exception of the effect given a certificate of baptism.
12. The French text of article 213 of the Civil Code of 1825, which corre-
sponds to article 194 of the present Code, uses the expression la possession
constante de 'dtat in precisely the same way as it is used in article 320 of
the Code Napoleon which corresponds to it. Similarly, the French text of
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tation which attach to it. Again, this element was lacking in
George v. Bertrand, though it would have been present in the
Houma Well Service case had the child lacked a title.
Where there is neither possession of the status nor title to
it, the child may prove his legitimate filiation under the terms of
article 196, which allows him to prove it by either written or
oral proof. But article 197 follows immediately upon article 196
and limits it by allowing any relevant evidence to be introduced
to rebut the evidence permitted under article 196.1 Thus article
197 prevents the presumption of legitimacy of article 184 from
coming into operation where the proof of filiation is by any means
article 214 of the Civil Code of 1825, corresponding to article 195 of our present
Code and to article 321 of the French Code, uses the expression la possession
d'dtat in exactly the same way as its counterpart in the French Civil Code.
See 3 LOUISuANA LEGAL ARCHrvES, THE COMPILED EDITION OF THE CIVIL CODES OF
LOUISIANA 113-16 (1940).
13. The only hypothesis making article 197 consistent with articles 184-
192 is that the first applies only in the cases specified in article 196. This
theory has been adopted by the French jurisprudence. See DALLOZ, CODE
CiviL art. 325, n.3 (Paris, 1969). This construction finds very strong support
in the Exposd des Motifs on paternity and filiation addressed to the French
legislators on their session of 21 Ventose, Year 11 of the Revolution (March
21, 1803), 2 Proeds-Verbaux du Conseil d'Etat contenant la Discussion du
Projet de Code Civil 567, at 573-75:
"Aprds avoir dtabli le petit nombre d'exceptions d la rtgle generale pater
est quem nuptiae demonstrant, la lot 4ndique aux enfans Idgitimes les preuves
qu'ils doivent fournir de leur filiation.
"Lorsque l'enfant n'a ni possession constante ni titre, ou lorsqu'il a dtd
inscrit, soit sous de faux noms, solt comme nd de pdre et mdre inconnus, il
en rdsulte une presomption tros-forte qu'il n'appartient point au marage."J
After stating that even in the above circumstances a child should be able
to prove his filiation by testimony, if the proof is commenced in writing
(Louisiana has no requirement that the proof be so commenced), the expo-
sition of motive continues:
"La lot veille suffisamment d l'interet des families, lorsque, dans tow les
cases ou V'enfant peut appeler des tdmoins, elles sont autorisdes d faire la
prevue contraire par tous les moyens propres a dtablir que le reclamant n'est
pas V'enfant de la mdre qu'll prdtend avoir.
"La preuve de maternitd qui aurait dtd faire contre la femme, n'est pas
regardde comme preuve de la paternitd contre le marl ...." Id. at 577.
Writer's translation: "After having established the small number of
exceptions to the general rule pater est quem nuptiae demonatrant, the law
indicates to legitimate children the proofs which they must furnish of their
filiation.
"When the child has neither constant possession nor title, or when he
has been registered under false names or as born of unknown father and
mother, a very strong presumption results from this that he does not belong
to the marriage.
"The law sufficiently heeds the interest of families, when, in every case,
where the child can call witnesses, they are authorized to make contrary
proof by all proper means that the claimant is not the child of the mother
which he pretends to have.
"The proof of maternity made against the wife is not regarded as proof
of paternity of the husband . (Emphasis added.)
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other than title or possession.1 4 Since the evidence of filiation in
George v. Bertrand was neither that of title nor that of posses-
sion, it must be considered a species of "written or oral" proof,
permissible under article 196, but not bringing the presumption
of article 184 into operation.15
Where the court erred in George v. Bertrand was in treating
the mere fact, established by some means other than title or
possession, that the decedent was born during the existence of
the earlier marriage as conclusive proof of his having been born
of the marriage. This error apparently owes its origin to the
typically poor English translation of the original French text of
what are now our articles of Title VII of Book I, "OF FATHER AND
CHID."
Our present articles translate the phrase "dans le mariage"
by "during the marriage," whereas it should be translated "within
the marriage."'8 If one reads article 184 in the light of the French
texts of the articles of our old codes corresponding to it, the re-
lationship between the articles on "legitimacy resulting from
marriage" and those on "the manner of proving legitimate filia-
tion" becomes clearer.
Article 184 should read: "The law considers the husband of
the mother as the father of all children conceived within the
marriage." Mere proof that a child was born at some time during
the marriage is not proof that he was born within the marriage.
14. See note 13 supra.
15. See note 13 aupra.
16. There are many reasons why the phrase dan8 Is mariage as used in
the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 must be translated "within the marriage"
rather than "during the marriage." For example, the latter translation,
found In the present text of article 179, makes nonsense out of article 182.
Article 179 states: "Legitimate children are those who are born during the
marriage"; yet article 182 recognizes that some of the children born during
the marriage may be adulterous bastards, should either or both of the parties
to adultery be married. Use of the translation "within the marriage" would
not lead to a self-contradiction in the Code.
Furthermore, the redactors of our Civil Code appear to have quite de-
liberately chosen the word daon over the usual French word for "during,"
pendant. Pendant is used in the articles of the Code Napoleon from which
our articles were taken. This writer could find no project of the French
Code from which dan8 could have simply been copied without intention of
making the meaning more precise. The use of dan8 was probably taken
from the final Projet's chapter, Des enfans legitimes ou nds dans Is ma-
riage. Clearly n48 dans le mariage is equated with legitimacy, an equa-
tion true only if dane is used to mean within rather than during. The pre-
cision of the redactors' use of dane in our Code should be given effect.
Moreover, our Code contrasts legitimate children as born dane Ie mar-
dage with illegitimate children as born hors du mariage, outside marriage(LA. CIv. CODE arts. 179, 180). "Within" is an appropriate contrary to "out-
side"; "during" is not.
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There must be proof of the type discussed in articles 193-195
before the presumption that the child was born within the mar-
riage and is therefore a legitimate child of the marriage becomes
applicable.
Since the decedent in George v. Bertrand had neither title
to nor possession of the status of the legitimate child of his
mother's prior marriage, the court should have considered the
question of his status independently of any presumption that he
was the legitimate child of the prior marriage. The evidence
that he was born during the existence of his mother's marriage
to another man should, under article 196 of the Civil Code, be
considered as, at most, some evidence that he was conceived and
born within the marriage, but not as conclusive evidence. Under
article 197 it should be weighed against any evidence that he was
always treated as the child of one other than his mother's hus-
band at the time, that he was born while his mother was living
in open concubinage with another man, that he was always
treated as the legitimated child of the marriage between his
biological father and his mother, and any other relevant evidence.
It has previously been pointed out in this Review that the
present jurisprudence leads to unjust results that could be avoided
if we were to follow the lead of the French jurisprudence in not
applying any presumption of legitimate filiation in situations
where the child has neither title to nor possession of the status
of a legitimate child of the marriage.17 It is submitted that in
the light of Levy it is not only wise, but urgent, that Louisiana
adopt such an interpretation of the Civil Code and that only
such an interpretation can give meaning to articles 193-197.
There is no good reason to prevent the adoption of such an
interpretation. The prior jurisprudence could be overruled on
any one of a number of grounds: 18 that Levy necessitated an in-
terpretation of the Civil Code that would recognize the relation-
ship between a child and his biological father where it is the
biological father who had always given the child the psychological
and economic support that a father owes a child; that the prior
jurisprudence was based upon a mistranslation of the French
17. Bee The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1958-1958
Term-Persons, 14 LA. L. REv. 114, 121-23 (1953); Pascal, Who Is the Papa?,
18 LA. L. REV. 685 (1957).
18. See the dissenting opinion of Judges Frug6 and Miller in Tannehill
v. Tannehill, 226 So.2d 185 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969), for another interpretation
of the Civil Code articles on paternity, which would lead to a more rational
result than the present jurisprudence.
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text of articles now in our Code in English only and that it is
therefore in conflict with the well-established jurisprudence that
the French text prevails over the English;19 or that in these cir-
cumstances the judicial decisions have not given rise to the long
series of actions by the people based upon the belief that the rule
announced in them was law and hence that there was no custom
in the sense of article 3 of the Civil Code.
To overrule openly the erroneous jurisprudence of the past
would be better than devising new artificialities to overcome old
ones, as was done in an ingenious dissenting opinion in George
v. Bertrand, which concluded that the decedent must have had
two legitimate fathers. 20 It is apparent from its legislative history
that the Code does not envision that a child born while his mother
was living in open concubinage should have two fathers to look
to for support if his mother should later marry his biological
father, whereas a child born to a chaste mother should have only
a single father to support him.
ALIMoNY'
In Smith v. Smith2' the Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit
was presented with a novel question of interpretation of article
160 of the Civil Code as amended. 22 The trial judge had awarded
Mrs. Smith a divorce on the ground of adultery as well as ali-
mony payments.
On appeal Mr. Smith sought reversal of the lower court's
judgment only on the latter question. The defendant had at-
tempted to introduce evidence of the wife's fault to defeat the
claim for alimony. He alleged that she had committed a number
of acts of cruel treatment, that she had made an attempt on his
19. Bee Shelp v. National Surety Corp., 833 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1964),
for an excellent discussion and application of that jurisprudence. The juris-
prudence on this point is quite long. See, e.g., Phelps v. Reinach, 38 La. Ann.
547 (1886).
20. In his dissenting opinion Judge Tate said that he did not reach the
constitutional issue posed by Levy because under the construction he gave
the Code It was unnecessary to do so. Judge Tate's opinion does have the
advantage over that of the majority in that It would have given a constitu-
tional interpretation to the provisions of the Code in question in the light of
Justice Douglas' flat In Levy, but could produce other unnecessary complica-
tions.
21. 216 So.2d 391 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
22. LA. Civ. CODE art. 160: "When the wife has not been at fault, and
she has not sufficient means for her support, the court may allow her, out
of the property and earnings of the husband, alimony which shall not exceed
one-third of his Income when:
"1. The wife obtains a divorce.
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life, and that she had abandoned the matrimonial domicile with-
out cause. The trial judge ruled that the husband could not in-
troduce his evidence on the ground that if the wife is granted a
divorce on the ground of adultery, the husband cannot contend
she is guilty of fault barring alimony.
The court of appeal reversed and remanded on the point of
alimony and held that the wife had to prove herself free from
fault in order to be entitled to alimony under article 160 even
where the divorce is granted on the basis of fault rather than
living separate and apart.
The court's interpretation is sound, not only on the ground
of the mandate of article 1323 which it cited, 24 but also because it
promotes the preservation of the family unit. To rule that the
husband could not prove the fault of the wife would be to require
a husband to file suit for separation, instead of allowing him to
attempt to weather a marital storm if his attempt might involve
the risk that he could be provoked or tempted to an act which
would be categorized as fault. The law does not require a wife
to divorce her husband for adultery; why then should it require
the husband to end the marital bond rather than commit it? The
civil law has generally recognized that a marriage might endure
as a viable social unit despite a husband's occasional lapses from
virtue.25 The court's decision, by not positively promoting di-
vorce for the husband's self-protection, may afford tolerable
marriages an opportunity to evolve into sound ones. Both the
parties to the marriage and the rest of society would thus benefit.
Certain implications of the decision remain to be considered.
The court continued to interpret "fault" in article 160 to mean
that degree of fault which would have been grounds for separa-
tion or divorce. If the husband proved his assertions, he would
have established sufficient fault to have entitled him to a separa-
tion under article 138.
But what would have been the case if the husband had
proved sufficient fault to entitle him to a divorce? The court's
language implies that under article 160 as amended he would be
23. Id. art. 13: "When a law is clear, and free from all ambiguity, the
letter of it is not to be disregarded, under the pretext of pursuing its spirit."
24. Smith v. Smith, 216 So.2d 391, 393 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
25. E.g., the original text of article 230 of the Code Napoleon, which gi-e
the wife the right to divorce her husband for adultery only if he kept his
concubine in the matrimonial dwelling. The husband's right to divorce under
article 229 was not so limited, nor is the wife's today.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
able to use the wife's fault to defeat her claim for alimony,
whereas under the jurisprudence on mutuality of fault proof of
equal fault on the wife's part would bar the divorce.2 If the
court's reasoning is correct, then the amendment to article 160
must be viewed as tacitly abolishing the jurisprudential rule on
recrimination, at least in regard to divorce.
TUTORSHIP
In the Succession of Quave7 the Court of Appeal for the
Fourth Circuit rejected the contention of the aunt of a child that
article 263 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the judge
ought to appoint to the tutorship the nearest ascendant in the
direct line of the minor," ought not be applied where it may be
in "the best interests of the child" to appoint a collateral instead.
One judge dissented, partly on the ground that article 263 was
"directory rather than mandatory," the aunt having urged that
the use of the word "ought" in article 263 left the judge with the
discretion necessary to appoint her instead of a qualified ascen-
dant.2 8
Assuming the correctness of the court's finding that the as-
cendant whom it appointed ought not to have been disqualified
on the ground that she was incapable of performing the duties
of tutrix or otherwise unfit,29 the majority's opinion is clearly
correct.
To read article 263 as directory rather than mandatory is
equivalent to reading it out of the Code altogether. The aunt's
claim that the word "ought" should be construed as granting the
discretion she sought to have exercised is erroneous, since "ought"
26. E.g., Callahan v. Callais, 224 La. 901, 71 So.2d 320 (1954); J.F.C. v.
M.E., 6 Rob. 135 (La. 1843).
27. 214 So.2d 260 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
28. The main thrust of the arguments of the aunt, the dissenting opinion,
and the trial court's opinion was that the ascendant in question should be
disqualified as tutrix under article 4231(6) of the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure. This writer does not feel that extensive comment upon the matter
is appropriate, as it is basically a question of fact, but on the basis of the
facts as reported In the decision it is an extremely close case. The trial and
dissenting judges' opinion may well have been correct as a matter of fact.
The difficulty with their opinions is that they come very close to barring the
grandmother's right to the tutorship on the ground of her fundamentalist
religious practices. Such a decision would violate the principle of freedom
of exercise of religion. The other factors discussed by the trial judge might
have been enough to deny her the tutorship, but commenting upon the ri-
gidity and strictness of the grandmother's religion prejudiced the argument
29. See note 31 supra.
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is merely the English translation of a form of the word devoir30
which means to have a duty to do something, that is, ought as
equivalent to must. Judgment on this point in the aunt's favor
would have carried dangers for a consistent application of the




Public and Private Domain
Public property, namely, property of the state and its politi-
cal subdivisions, is divided in Louisiana and in France into prop-
erty of the public domain and property of the private domain.
This division, which corresponds to some extent to the Roman
distinction between res publicae and res fisci, has given rise to
doctrinal controversies in France. Writers are not in agreement
as to which things belong to the public domain and which to the
private domain, nor as to the criteria for this division.' In Louisi-
ana, courts have dealt with the practical implications of this
division in a number of cases.
2
In Landry v. Council of Parish of East Baton Rouge,s action
was brought by persons using a municipal airport to enjoin its
proposed closure and relocation by municipal authorities. In a
scholarly opinion, the Court of Appeal for the First Circuit held
that the decision to close and relocate the airport was not an abuse
of discretion; hence, plaintiffs were not entitled to injunction.
In the course of its opinion, the court classified the municipal air-
port as a thing of the private domain of the municipality, adopt-
ing the view that the criterion for the distinction between things
of the public domain and of the private domain is the concept
30. The form was the third person singular indicative, doit. See 3 LOUi-
SIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES, THE COMBINED EDITIONS OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA
151 (1940) for the French text of the article of the Civil Code of 1825 corre-
sponding to the present article 263.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIvIL LAW PROPERTY, § 30 (1966).
2. see e.g., Bullis v. Town of Jackson, 203 La. 289, 14 So.2d 1 (1943); Town
of Farmerville v. Commercial Credit Co., 173 La. 43, 136 So. 82 (1931); City
of New Orleans v. Salmen Brick & Lumber Co., 135 La. 828, 66 So. 237 (1914);
Daublin v. Mayor of New Orleans, 1 Mart.(O.S.) 185 (La. 1810); Louisiana
Highway Comm'n v. Raxsdale, 12 So.2d 631 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1943).
3. 220 So.2d 795 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
